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Following  the  entry  into  force  of the  Paris  Agreement  in  November  2016,  governments  around  the  world
are  now  expected  to turn  their  nationally  determined  contributions  into  concrete  climate  policies.  Given
the  global  public  good  nature  of  climate  change  mitigation  and  the  important  cross-country  differences
in  marginal  abatement  costs,  distributing  mitigation  efforts  across  countries  could substantially  lower
the  overall  cost  of  implementing  climate  policy.  However,  abating  emissions  abroad  instead  of domesti-
cally  may  face  important  political  and  popular  resistance.  We  ran  a lab  experiment  with  more  than  300
participants  and  asked them  to  choose  between  a domestic  and  an  international  reforestation  project.  We
tested  the effect  of  three  informational  treatments  on  the  allocation  of participants’  endowment  between
the  domestic  and  the  international  project.  The  treatments  consisted  in:  (1) making  more  salient  the  cost-
effectiveness  gains  associated  with  offsetting  carbon  abroad;  (2)  providing  guarantees  on  the  reliability  of
reforestation  programmes;  (3) stressing  local  ancillary  beneﬁts  associated  with  domestic  offset  projects.eforestation
cceptability
We found  that  stressing  the  cost-effectiveness  of  the  reforestation  programme  abroad  did  increase  its
support,  the  economic  argument  in favour  of offsetting  abroad  being  otherwise  overlooked  by partici-
pants.  We  relate  this  ﬁnding  to  the  recent  literature  on  the  drivers  of  public  support  for climate  policies,
generally  pointing  to  a gap  between  people’s  preferences  and economists’  prescriptions.
©  2018 Department  of  Forest  Economics,  Swedish  University  of Agricultural  Sciences,  Umea˚.
Published  by  Elsevier  GmbH.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://ntroduction
Following the 2016 entry into force of the Paris Agreement,
overnments are now expected to turn their greenhouse gas emis-
ions pledges into concrete climate policies. These policies need
ot only to be sufﬁciently effective to reach the emissions abate-
ent objectives, but also to be as inexpensive as possible to leave
ome economic and political room for further policy tightening, in
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particular when it will come to set new ambitions in 2023. Only in
this way, the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement can be
met. Since greenhouse gases mix  uniformly in the atmosphere, and
given the important differences in cross-country marginal abate-
ment costs, distributing abatement efforts across countries could
substantially lower the overall cost of implementing a global cli-
mate policy (Morris et al., 2012; Kriegler et al., 2014).
The choice of the policy instrument is crucial to ensure that
the abatement objectives can be reached at a reasonable cost.
Economists contend that carbon pricing represents the central
pillar of the policy package necessary to transform emissions tar-
gets into effective abatements (Goulder and Parry, 2008; Aldy and
Stavins, 2012). However, important political resistance opposes the
use of carbon pricing, which explains the limited diffusion of carbon
taxes and cap-and-trade programmes around the world (Baranzini
and Carattini, 2014; World Bank, 2017). The same resistance also
applies to the use of carbon offsets resulting from activities or
projects implemented abroad, but used to compensate domestic
 Sciences, Umea˚. Published by Elsevier GmbH. This is an open access article under
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missions, as well as, more generally, to the mechanisms permit-
ing the compensation of emissions among countries (Monbiot,
007; Schneider, 2009). For instance, the European Union (EU)
missions Trading Scheme capped until 2013 the amount of car-
on credits that ﬁrms could buy from emissions abatement projects
aking place outside the EU. Since 2013, international credits are
o longer accepted. Similarly, the use of international offsets is
urrently capped in the California cap-and-trade scheme, and inter-
ational offsets may  disappear altogether from this scheme as it
nters the third compliance period in 2018. In the case of Califor-
ia, strong resistance to the use of offsets comes in particular from
ocal environmental justice groups, which claim that ﬁrms should
educe their emissions locally, and provide co-beneﬁts to local com-
unities (Schatzki and Stavins, 2009; Pastor et al., 2013). The 2009
axman–Markey bill also included a cap for the use of carbon
ffsets, related to the location of abatement efforts. Domestic and
nternational offset programmes were each capped at 1 billion met-
ic tons, with the possibility for the US Environmental Protection
gency to shift part of the domestic cap to international offsets
nly if it could be determined that the domestic supply was  insuf-
cient. The room for abating greenhouse gas emissions abroad is
lso limited by law in other contexts. In Switzerland, for instance, a
inimum of 30% of the total emissions reduction must be achieved
omestically. Stronger requirements may  apply for some indus-
ries. For instance, fossil-thermal power plants are required to offset
ll of their emissions, 50% of which must be compensated domes-
ically.
At the same time, some countries, such as Norway, Finland,
weden or Costa Rica, plan to become carbon neutral over the next
ecades, an objective that potentially implies a large use of offset-
ing practices. While Costa Rica plans to undertake local measures
o offset emissions through reforestation, reaching this objective
n Scandinavian countries would very likely require the purchase
f a substantial amount of carbon offsets from foreign countries.
weden, for instance, plans to cut its domestic emissions by 85%,
hile offsetting the remaining amount. This paper is motivated
y the conﬂict between the large potential cost savings associated
ith abating emissions through projects implemented abroad and
he possible political resistance to such practice.
Some evidence already suggests that the public may  not always
avour the most efﬁciency-enhancing solution in climate policy,
ven when pay-offs are transparent (Cherry et al., 2012). People
ay  not even pay attention to the provided quantity of public good,
f their motivation is impurely altruistic and driven by the moral
atisfaction of contributing (cf. Andreoni, 1990). For instance, using
tated preferences methods, Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) ﬁnd
hat the willingness to pay for a public good may  not be inﬂuenced
y the quantity provided: individuals may  not necessarily under-
tand that different quantities of public good can be provided with
he same contribution. This difference can, however, be very large,
specially for environmental goods such as carbon offsets, whose
osts can vary greatly depending on location.
In addition, practical reservations have been raised to the pur-
hase of international carbon offsets. Evidence of abuses in the
dditionality condition have clearly contributed to reduce the
redibility of the UNFCCC’s mechanisms to facilitate international
missions trading, such as the Clean Development Mechanism and
oint Implementation (see Schneider and Kollmuss, 2015; Tirole,
012). In the light of these critiques, the preference that the general
ublic seems to give to local projects, and to standards certifying
rojects generating emissions offsets abroad, should not surprise
see Blasch and Farsi, 2014). However, beyond this, little is known
n how to overcome these obstacles and increase the popularity of
nternational carbon offsets.
A new literature analysing this question empirically is thus
eeded. Torres et al. (2015) use a choice experiment to test thet Economics 32 (2018) 1–12
effect of distance to the mitigation site on the propensity to support
mitigation activities. This stated preference study ﬁnds a preference
for local mitigation, which provides local co-beneﬁts. All potential
mitigation sites are, however, located in Mexico, where the survey
takes place. The international dimension, and the related hetero-
geneity in abatement costs, is thus left for future research. Two
additional studies shed more light on the question of domestic vs.
international abatements. Anderson and Bernauer (2016) recruit
participants on an online labour market and analyse the effect of
different informational treatments on stated support for domes-
tic vs. international offsets. People seem to express higher support
for international abatements when the argument of efﬁciency (vs.,
e.g. ethicality) is raised, even though no real carbon offsets are pro-
posed and no real monetary consequences are present. Diederich
and Goeschl (2017) recruit German participants on an online sur-
vey platform to participate in an experiment in which, depending
on the treatment, they may  be offered the purchase of local (EU-
based) or developing country offsets. Inference is this time based
on revealed preferences. In the local treatment, participants are
reminded that it is in Germany, where they live, that they are
generating emissions. In the developing country treatment, par-
ticipants are informed that the offset projects are certiﬁed Gold
Standard and will be realised in an environmentally-friendly way
while providing beneﬁts to the local population (such as jobs). The
demand for these two  offset options is compared to a neutrally-
framed treatment (the control group), where the location of the
abatement is also explicit (the EU), but no attempts to stimulate
guilt or affect decisions are made. Diederich and Goeschl (2017)
analyse the demand for carbon offsets across treatments and ﬁnd
that location does not matter. If anything, their informational treat-
ments increase overall contributions with respect to the neutral
framing. Note, however, that in all treatments, including the neutral
framing, participants are informed that the climate is indifferent
about where mitigation is carried out (that is, location does not
matter).
Our paper also uses experimental methods, inferring from
revealed preferences. We  contribute to this nascent literature by
focusing speciﬁcally on the allocation decision that determines how
demand for domestic vs. international offsets changes depending
on the information provided. Our approach thus exploits a real
situation, in which there is a real difference in location and abate-
ment costs between two otherwise similar offsetting projects. In
this setting, we  analysed the role of informational treatments in
conjunction with the real difference in the offset price tag. In short,
our experiment went as follows. We  gathered about 300 students in
the lab and observed how they allocated their endowment between
two reforestation projects, one taking place domestically and one
abroad. We provided three randomised informational treatments.
The treatments mimicked the role of a political campaign trying to
foster (or hamper) the political support for generating carbon off-
sets from reforestation projects implemented in a foreign country,
instead of domestically. Two  treatments played in favour of carbon
offsets generated abroad by (1) emphasising the cost-effectiveness
related to international projects and (2) giving guarantees on the
reliability of the reforestation programmes. The third treatment
stressed the local ancillary beneﬁts from domestic carbon offset
projects in terms of biodiversity, recreational activities, protection
from natural disasters and local employment. We  compared these
three treatment groups with a control group, subject to a neutrally-
framed treatment.
We found that stressing the cost-effectiveness of the interna-
tional reforestation programme led to a signiﬁcant increase in
contributions to the latter. That is, some participants seemed to
overlook the price differential, absent any speciﬁc treatment lever-
aging it. We  did not ﬁnd any effect for the other treatments.
Participants seemed to already factor in the existence of local co-
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eneﬁts and seemed not to be questioning the credibility of the
elected reforestation programmes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
ion “Methodology” introduces our hypotheses, the experimental
esign, and the econometric approach. Section “Results” presents
ur data and results. Section “Conclusion” concludes.
ethodology
conomic background and hypotheses
In this paper, we focus on reforestation programmes. The poten-
ial for climate change mitigation of forest projects is considered
ubstantial (Bellassen and Luyssaert, 2014), given the generally low
arginal costs of reforestation (van Kooten et al., 2004; Tavoni et al.,
007; Nielsen et al., 2014). In addition, it is estimated that 20% of
lobal greenhouse gas emissions are caused by deforestation, twice
s much as transportation (IPCC, 2014). As a result, avoided defor-
station and af-/re-forestation programmes may  play an important
ole in climate change mitigation. For instance, Potter et al. (2007)
stimate that up to 20% of US emissions could be offset through
orests sinks. Forest offsets are encouraged since the Kyoto Proto-
ol within the LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry)
ctivities of the Clean Development Mechanism (UNFCCC, 2007)
nd may  also play an important role in the achievement of the
ecent agreement that the International Civil Aviation Organization
eached in October 2016 to limit the growth of carbon emissions
n the civil aviation sector. According to this voluntary agreement,
rom 2020, any increase in airline carbon emissions should be com-
ensated through the purchase of carbon offsets.
The abundance of opportunities for carbon sinks in forests is
nly one of the reasons for focusing on forest offsets. From an exper-
mental perspective, forests provide two additional beneﬁts. First,
orest-based offsets are cognitively easy to understand for partici-
ants. Second, while trees and forests may  differ across countries in
any characteristics, they can still represent the ideal of a homo-
eneous good in terms of CO2 sequestration. Indeed, the effect on
limate change mitigation of one ton of abated CO2 is the same irre-
pective of the abatement location. In our experiment, relatively
recise information on the CO2 sequestration ability of each tree is
vailable for both reforestation programmes in our study.
We are, however, aware of the concerns that have been raised
bout the limits of forest sinks. Unlike decarbonisation processes,
uch as the development of renewable energy, forests sinks are
ffected by the so-called “permanence problem” (Gren and Zeleke,
016). Indeed, uncertainties regarding climate change, the occur-
ence of wildﬁres or future anthropogenic activities, provide no
uarantee that all new forests (and thus the stored carbon) will
tand in the long run (Galik and Jackson, 2009). Given that car-
on sequestration in forests is potentially reversible (Watson
t al., 2000), some national policies do not include international
fforestation programmes in their eligible offset programmes (e.g.
wiss Federal Council, 2016).
On top of these forest-speciﬁc concerns, one may  have gen-
ral reservations regarding the additionality, or ethical foundations,
f offset programmes in general (Anderson, 2012; Tirole, 2012;
chneider and Kollmuss, 2015; Carattini and Tavoni, 2016). Prac-
ical reservations may  be related to the (in)effectiveness of
arbon credits. Ethical considerations may  be related to the “com-
odiﬁcation” of nature, which is an argument often used by
nvironmentalists to oppose the use of market-based solutions
o environmental externalities (Baron and Leshner, 2000; Sandel,
012; Braaten et al., 2015).
In this paper, we analyse the demand for local and international
orest offsets despite their potential weaknesses. While our maint Economics 32 (2018) 1–12 3
research question concerns the preference for domestic vs. interna-
tional carbon offsets, in our experimental setting we  also consider
the general demand for carbon offsets and take care of potential
concerns that our participants may  have towards them.
From an economic perspective, purchasing carbon offsets is a
real-life decision with a private cost to the individual. Individuals
may  be willing to voluntarily contribute to a public good such as
climate change mitigation if, for instance, they derive some utility
from the public good being provided (in case of pure altruism) or if
they derive some utility from their contribution, due to warm glow
(Andreoni, 1990) or positive self-image (Nyborg et al., 2006). In the
case of offsets, individuals may  also be willing to engage in the pri-
vate provision of a public good if this may  allow compensating other
activities to which they contributed and that might have reduced
the overall level of the same public good (Kotchen, 2009). Fol-
lowing the environmental psychology literature, we would expect
pro-environmental behaviour to depend positively on the follow-
ing two arguments. First, the feeling of responsibility to contribute
to the environmental public good at stake, the so-called “ascrip-
tion of responsibility”. Second, the perception of the environmental
impact that behaving in a pro-environmental way would gener-
ate, the so-called “awareness of consequences” (see e.g. Stern et al.,
1999).
Concerning the preferences for domestic vs. international car-
bon offsets, we  considered three main drivers. Cost-effectiveness
reasons justify international offsetting. However, experimental evi-
dence from markets with externalities suggest that people may
overlook efﬁciency gains, even with salient pay-off structures. This
problem is particularly relevant for climate change mitigation.
Kallbekken et al. (2011) show how tax aversion can affect Pigou-
vian taxes, hampering the implementation of instruments that
would increase efﬁciency in the experiment, and allow for pay-off
maximisation (cf. also Kallbekken et al., 2010). When it comes to
internalising externalities, “half” measures such as subsidies may
be preferred to “full” measures such as carbon taxes. That is, also in
the lab, where the most cost-effective solution can be relatively
easily identiﬁed, people may  prefer sub-optimal solutions, even
though these may  imply lower pay-offs (Cherry et al., 2012).
People’s ethical and practical reservations to the use of carbon
offsets, as described above, may  also be inﬂuenced by the location
of the offset project. We conjecture that these reservations, of prac-
tical character in particular, may  be stronger in the case of projects
undertaken in emerging economies. For instance, Gampfer et al.
(2014) ﬁnd that international climate transfers receive more pub-
lic support if the donation is made to a trustworthy government.
Blasch and Farsi (2014) ﬁnd that certiﬁcations by a trusted govern-
ment agency or a United Nations body increase the willingness to
pay for carbon offsetting. People may  also have genuine preferences
for local offsets. For instance, people could expect substantial local
co-beneﬁts from offsetting, which would increase the propensity
to choose a domestic project (Torres et al., 2015).
Hence, we formulate the following hypotheses on the poten-
tial effect of each type of informational treatment applied in our
experiment:
Efﬁciency hypothesis: Participants may  pay attention to the
amount allocated to carbon offsets, but not necessarily to the total
quantity of emissions abated. Reminding them the cost differential
between domestic and international reforestation programmes
increases the amount allocated to foreign programmes and thus
the overall abatement of carbon emissions.
Conﬁdence hypothesis: Participants may  not ﬁnd projects abroad
trustworthy. Providing guarantees on the trustworthiness of refor-
estation project providers increases the amount allocated to
programmes abroad and thus overall abatement.
4 f Forest Economics 32 (2018) 1–12
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Table 1
Reforestation programmes.
Programme 1 Programme 2
Place Visp, Switzerland Limay, Nicaragua A. Baranzini et al. / Journal o
Local beneﬁts hypothesis: Given that the main focus of the con-
sidered reforestation programmes is on greenhouse gas emissions,
participants may  neglect their local beneﬁts. Reminding them the
beneﬁts of local forests increases the amount allocated to domestic
reforestation programmes.
Most of the recent literature has examined the demand for car-
on offsets relying on stated preferences, while only a few papers
ttempted to provide evidence based on revealed preferences by
sing lab and ﬁeld experiments.1 Since stated preferences are sub-
ect to several well-known biases (see e.g. Alberini and Kahn, 2006),
n this paper, we empirically address the acceptability of inter-
ational carbon offsets using an experimental approach. Such an
pproach is arguably the best tool for inferring from revealed pref-
rences, testing the effect of alternative policy designs that are not
et observed in reality, and causally identifying the effect of our
reatments on people’s preferences (Falk and Heckman, 2009). In
ddition, the type of behaviour observed in the lab can be very
imilar to the one undertaken in a similar natural setting, and the
ehavioural responses of student and non-student participants in
ab experiments are often the same (cf. Alm et al., 2015). When it
omes to analysing pro-social behaviour, or preferences over poli-
ies, one may  argue that the likelihood that behaviour in the lab
iffers from a real-life situation increases. While this can be true,
ro-social behaviour in the lab remains strongly correlated with
ro-social behaviour in the ﬁeld (Benz and Meier, 2008). That said,
e are aware that each methodological decision involves a trade-
ff and we devote a section, below, to the external validity of our
esults, and how it may  have implications for policy recommenda-
ions.
xperimental design
Following from the previous section, we selected two real refor-
station programmes providing the same abatement per tree in
oth the domestic (developed) and the foreign (developing) coun-
ry, but with a much lower price in the latter. The programme in
he home country was located in Visp, Switzerland, while the pro-
ramme  in the developing country was located in Limay, Nicaragua.
n these programmes, a tree in both Switzerland and Nicaragua cap-
ured 15 kg of CO2 per year, while its price was 10 Swiss francs (CHF)
n the former and only 3 in the latter country.2 That is, given the
rice differential, with the same budget (e.g. with the same ﬁscal
evenues from a carbon tax), emissions abatements could be three
imes larger in Nicaragua.
We ran the experiment in Geneva, Switzerland, in December
015, with a sample of more than 300 undergraduate students in
usiness administration (management) in their ﬁrst or second year,
ll enrolled in mandatory microeconomics classes at the introduc-
ory or intermediate level.3 The experiment was conducted during
lass time, to prevent students’ self-selection. After entering the
lass, we brieﬂy presented the experiment and instructed partici-
ants as per standard procedure in lab experiments.
The experiment was organised in two stages. A ﬁrst stage
etermined participants’ endowment, and their voluntary contri-
ution to carbon offset projects. The allocation of this contribution
etween domestic and international projects was the focus of the
econd stage.
1 Stated preference studies include Brouwer et al. (2008), MacKerron et al. (2009),
arlsson et al. (2012), Blasch and Farsi (2014), Gampfer et al. (2014), Blasch and
hndorf (2015), and Torres et al. (2015). Ovchinnikova et al. (2009), Löfgren et al.
2012), Diederich and Goeschl (2014, 2017), and Kesternich et al. (2016), are exam-
les of revealed preference studies.
2 1CHF ≈ 1USD at the time of the study.
3 See Appendix B for the full questionnaire (translated from French).CO2/tree/year 15 kg 15 kg
Cost/tree CHF 10 CHF 3
In the ﬁrst stage, participants were randomly provided with
4 very general questions about microeconomics, whose answers
determined their monetary endowment, along with a show-up fee
of 2 Swiss francs. Each correct answer was  rewarded with 2 francs,
and so participants had the possibility to earn up to 8 additional
francs.
Once the endowment was determined, participants were given
the option to donate a share of it to the purchase of carbon off-
sets through reforestation programmes. At this stage, participants
only decided how much money they wanted to spend on the pur-
chase of carbon offsets and how much to keep for themselves,
without further information on the speciﬁcities of the reforesta-
tion programme. Participants were informed about some basic facts
of climate change; were introduced to the role of deforestation
in increasing the stock of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmo-
sphere; and were made aware of the role of reducing deforestation
or increasing afforestation in helping mitigating climate change.
All participants had also been informed that a nominal reforesta-
tion certiﬁcate could have been made available to all purchasers of
carbon offsets, if they were willing to declare their identity once
completed the experiment. This procedure might have reassured
participants that the purchase of carbon offsets was  really taking
place, besides providing some reputational effects, which in gen-
eral tend to have a signiﬁcant positive impact on the contribution
to a public good (Milinski et al., 2002).
In the second stage, once the amount dedicated to reforestation
had been elicited, participants were asked to split it between the
two speciﬁc programmes. This decision represented our outcome
of interest, as it allowed understanding the preferences of people
towards generating carbon offsets through a domestic or an inter-
national reforestation programme. Basic information about both
reforestation programmes was  provided to all participants as done
in Table 1.4
Furthermore, additional information was  randomly provided
in the form of the following three treatments. Treatment 1 (T1)
stressed the price differential between a tree in Nicaragua and in
Switzerland, emphasising that funding the least-cost programme
would have resulted in higher emissions abatement, for a ﬁxed
contribution. T1 had thus been designed to test the efﬁciency
hypothesis. Treatment 2 (T2) informed participants that both pro-
grammes had been guaranteed by reputable and independent
institutions: the United Nations Environment Programme for the
Nicaraguan project and the local government for the domestic
programme. Hence, this treatment had been designed to test the
conﬁdence hypothesis. Treatment 3 (T3) introduced the role of local
ancillary beneﬁts of reforestation. We  recalled to participants the
recreational activities that the Swiss population uses to undertake
in local forests, the importance of these forests for the local biodi-
versity, their beneﬁts in terms of wood and non-wood products, as
well as their contribution to local jobs and economic growth. T3 had
been designed to test the local beneﬁts hypothesis, favouring the
domestic reforestation programme. A control group was assigned
4 Information on these reforestation programmes is available at https://www.
helvetia.com/ch/content/fr/qui-sommes-nous/engagement/foret-protectrice.html
(last accessed on November 26th, 2015) and http://www.tree-nation.com/plant
(last accessed on November 26th, 2015).
f Forest Economics 32 (2018) 1–12 5
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Contributors Non-contributors
Endowment 7.15 7.34
(1.90) (1.93)
Contribution 5.81 0
(2.59) (0)
Contribution (% of initial endowment) 0.83 0
(0.30) (0)A. Baranzini et al. / Journal o
 very neutral messaging. Following the standard procedure, we
dministered a short debrieﬁng survey to understand students’
ontributions and collected the usual socio-economic character-
stics.
conometric approach
We  analysed separately the data from the two  stages of our
xperiment. The ﬁrst stage determined participants’ contributions
o the purchase of carbon offsets. The second stage captured the
llocation decision between the domestic and international refor-
station programmes. In the empirical analyses, the second stage
ddressed our main research question. In the ﬁrst stage, given
hat our outcome variable, the ratio of contribution to forest pro-
rammes over endowment, was continuous and bounded between
 and 1, we estimated both an ordinary least square (OLS) model
nd a speciﬁc generalised linear model for fractional outcomes
GLM), as recommended by Baum (2008).5
In the econometric analysis of the second stage, we  tested
hether the differences among treatments were statistically sig-
iﬁcant, conditional on covariates, and assessed the magnitude of
he treatment effects. We  tested the following speciﬁcation:
i = ˛ + ˇ1T1 + ˇ2T2 + ˇ3T3 + X ′i + i (1)
n which our dependent variable Y is the percentage of partic-
pant i’s contribution allocated to the reforestation programme
mplemented abroad, ˛ a constant and ˇj the treatment effect
or treatments j = 1, 2, 3. Xi is a vector of control variables and 
he vector of associated coefﬁcients. Controls take into account
he possible heterogeneity across individuals, along with i, the
eteroskedasticity-robust standard error.6 Since the dependent
ariable was bounded between 0 and 1, we also estimated this
odel with OLS and GLM.
We then checked whether the treatment effects occurred on the
ntensive or extensive margins. For each treatment, we  could have
bserved the same proportion of participants contributing to the
nternational programme as in the control group, but these could
n average have been contributing a different amount (intensive
argin). Alternatively, we could have observed a different propor-
ion of participants contributing a positive sum to the international
rogramme, without necessarily providing a different contribution,
n average, than the control group (extensive margin).
To isolate the role of the extensive margin, we  assessed, with
LS and logit models, the effect of the treatments on the propor-
ion of individuals contributing a strictly positive amount to the
nternational programme. We  provided a further robustness test
xploiting a two-part model “à la Cragg”, which is appropriate for
imited dependent variables and integrates both ﬁrst stage and sec-
nd stage decisions into a single two-parts model. Following Cragg
1971), we considered that the decisions to contribute and the level
f this contribution might have been two different but simulta-
5 A tobit model could also be a potential candidate for a non-linear ﬁt of our data.
e  thus followed Papke and Wooldridge (1993) and applied a speciﬁcation link test
o  select the most appropriate model between the fractional logit GLM, and a tobit
odel. The speciﬁcation test rejected the null hypothesis of good link speciﬁcation
or the tobit model (p-value < 0.001), whereas it did not for the fractional logit GLM
p-value > 0.99). Based on the test outcome, we  selected GLM as our preferred non-
inear speciﬁcation. All additional estimations are available by the authors upon
equest.
6 Due to the randomised allocation of the treatments, the inclusion of control
ariables did not affect the coefﬁcients of the observed treatment effects, but it did
ncrease the model’s precision. Descriptive statistics for these variables are available
n  Table A.2 in Appendix A. The number of observations only slightly decreased
hen introducing control variables. The use of heteroskedasticity-robust standard
rrors was justiﬁed by standard heteroskedasticity tests such as modiﬁed Wald and
reusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg tests.Observations 261 46
Standard deviations in parentheses.
neous decisions, potentially driven by different factors. The ﬁrst
part of the model thus explained the probability to contribute to
forest carbon offsetting with a probit model, and the second part
explained the level of this contribution, conditional on strictly pos-
itive contributions.7
Results
Descriptive statistics and ﬁrst stage
Table 2 provides information on the ﬁrst stage for the full sam-
ple. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables are available
in Table A.1 in Appendix A. On average, participants contributed to
climate change mitigation with about 6 francs each, i.e. about 80%
of the average endowment of about 7 francs. Yet, 15% of them were
not willing to contribute to reforestation at all.
In this stage, we  analysed the propensity to contribute to a
generic reforestation programme generating carbon offsets, rela-
tive to the initial endowment, and its determinants. To measure
ascription of responsibility, we  used two variables. The ﬁrst vari-
able was the standard measure of climate concern from the Gallup
survey (cf. Lee et al., 2015) and the World Value Survey (WVS). Indi-
viduals were asked to answer on a 5 Likert scale from “I do not agree
at all” to “I totally agree” to the following statement: “I consider that
climate warming is a serious threat for the future”. We  transformed
this variable into a binary measure (called climate concern) taking
the value 1 if an individual “pretty much agrees” or “totally agrees”,
and 0 otherwise. As shown by the descriptive statistics in Table A.1
in Appendix A, the variable for climate concern scored particularly
high, with 86% of the sample declaring to be concerned by climate
change. For comparison, in the 2007 wave of the World Values Sur-
vey, climate concern in Switzerland was  about 89%. The second
variable was a dummy  taking value 1 if participants felt morally
obliged to contribute to climate change mitigation (we  call it moral
obligation). This variable resulted from the “pretty much agree” and
“totally agree” answers to the following statement: “I feel morally
obliged to protect the climate.” Compared to climate concern, a
relatively lower proportion (67%) stated to feel morally obliged to
contribute to climate change mitigation.
To measure awareness of consequences, we used a variable cap-
turing the belief that even small contributions to climate change
can be important, such as the ones under examination in this study.
This question was worded as follows: “How do you agree to the
following statement? ‘In my  opinion, even small contributions are
7 The Cragg model is intuitively similar to the Heckman two-stage model. How-
ever, our data did not suffer from a selection issue, as in Heckman (1977). In our
experiment we, indeed, did not face missing data, but a “corner at 0” issue (see
Wooldridge, 2010, chapter 16). That is, zeros were not present because of non-
observable responses but were rather the result of an optimal choice made by the
respondent. The Cragg model allows for two  separate simultaneous decisions but
does not correct for selection. It was thus the most appropriate approach for our con-
text. It also allowed to have the same covariates in both parts of the model without
the risk of collinearity (Madden, 2008).
6 f Forest Economics 32 (2018) 1–12
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Table 3
Average marginal effects on contributions.
(1) (2)
OLS GLM
Climate concern 0.039 0.016
(0.08) (0.07)
Small contributions are important 0.13* 0.11*
(0.07) (0.06)
Green member −0.001 −0.008
(0.05) (0.06)
Moral obligation 0.0099 0.016
(0.05) (0.04)
Belief about others’ contribution 0.71*** 0.68***
(0.06) (0.05)
Frequent forest user 0.071 0.070
(0.05) (0.05)
Practical reservations w.r.t. reforestation −0.069 −0.055
(0.05) (0.04)
Ethical reservations w.r.t. the
commodiﬁcation of nature
−0.024 −0.016
(0.04) (0.04)
Observations 299 299
Adjusted-R2 0.347
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
* A. Baranzini et al. / Journal o
seful to protect the climate’ ”. 85% of the sample considered that
ven small contributions can be important.
We note that considering a public good as important is a nec-
ssary, but not sufﬁcient, condition for its voluntary provision
Nyborg et al., 2006). That is, people cannot contribute to the pro-
ision of all public goods that they deem important. Whether an
ndividual is willing to contribute to a given good also depends on
he descriptive norm concerning the provision of such good, i.e.
hat others do. Much evidence has been provided on conditional
ooperation in local environments (cf. Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).
owever, conditional cooperation in the climate commons may
ppear less likely. Yet, according to Ostrom (2009), managing global
ilemmas requires as much trust as managing local dilemmas does.
strom’s claim relies on the observed existence of reciprocity and
rust at the local level, which may  beneﬁt the provision of any
ocial good, regardless of its local or global characteristics. Sup-
orting Ostrom’s intuition, Carattini et al. (2015) ﬁnd for instance a
egative correlation between trust and greenhouse gas emissions
mong European countries. Ostrom’s element of trust reconciles
ith the model of Nyborg et al. (2006): since the descriptive norm
s not always salient, individuals may  form expectations on other
eople’s contributions (see also Carattini et al., 2017b). This case
pplied to our experiment since communication was strictly for-
idden between players. Hence, to estimate the effect of expected
ooperation, we used a measure of participants’ belief of others’
ontribution. This variable was based on the answers to the fol-
owing question: “In your opinion, what share of their endowment
ther participants on average contributed to the reforestation pro-
ramme?”.
We also added to the model a few variables that were related to
he speciﬁcity of the public good under scrutiny. Since no details on
he location of the reforestation programmes were provided at this
tage, it is plausible that some individuals, especially those who
ere used to visit local forests, might have been more likely to
ontribute than others. Frequent usage is indeed a common deter-
inant of contribution to the provision of ecosystem services in
eneral (Czajkowski et al., 2014). We  thus asked how often the par-
icipant used to visit forests, in general, and added to the model a
ummy  variable to account for regular or frequent visits.
Since no guarantee on the quality of the project was given at the
rst stage, we captured possible practical reservations to the use of
orest carbon offsets. Our variable measured the degree of agree-
ent with the following statement: “Reforestation is effective in
educing the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere in the long run”. To cap-
ure general ethical considerations related to the commodiﬁcation
f nature, we exploited answers to the following statement: “I do
ot want to consider natural resources as a marketed commodity.”
Table 3 presents our estimates. Columns (1) and (2) show our
oefﬁcients for OLS and the average marginal effect of a fractional
ogit GLM, respectively. Since all estimates were statistically the
ame in both OLS and GLM models, and to allow for straightforward
nterpretation, we comment in what follows the estimated effects
ased on OLS.
All the coefﬁcients had the expected sign, except the one asso-
iated with green membership, but the latter was not statistically
igniﬁcant. Our results suggests that the demand for carbon offsets
enerated by reforestation programmes is dominated, statistically
peaking, by attitudinal variables, in particular, the belief that small
ontributions do help to make a difference, as well as the belief
bout others’ contributions. Results about the belief of others’ con-
ributions match the recent evidence of Blasch and Farsi (2014),
lasch and Ohndorf (2015) and Schwirplies and Ziegler (2016). All
hese studies indeed ﬁnd a positive effect on the demand for carbon
ffsets for variables very similar to our measure of beliefs about oth-
rs’ behaviour, namely, and respectively, “expected cooperation”,
expected share of offset customers in society” and “expectationp < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
of society”. Along with related literature showing similar patterns
for other climate-friendly behaviours, this evidence can be used
to support the existence of conditional cooperation in the climate
commons (Carattini et al., 2017b).
Not surprisingly for a lab experiment, even for those with a
relatively large sample, none of the other covariates reached the
standard threshold for statistical signiﬁcance, despite the expected
sign. We  note in particular that the frequent use of forests, or hav-
ing practical reservations related to forest offsets, had no signiﬁcant
impact on the average contribution to reforestation programmes.
In the questionnaire, we also asked for participants’ income.
Given the non-negligible decline in observations that the inclu-
sion of the income variable implied, we  did not consider income
differences in our model. Yet, we  note that running additional esti-
mations with such variable did not statistically affect the estimates
of Table 3, while the coefﬁcient for the income variable was  found
to be statistically insigniﬁcant. This result was unsurprising in our
context, also because the private demand for environmental quality
was likely to be only partially expressed, due to the (global) public
good characteristics of climate change mitigation (cf. Roca, 2003).
Second stage
The second stage included only participants providing a strictly
positive monetary contribution to the generic reforestation pro-
gramme. We  examined the decision to allocate such contribution
between the domestic and the international reforestation pro-
gramme. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the three
treatments or the control group, which resulted in 59–70 obser-
vations for each treatment. We  created our variable of interest
as a ratio, with the participant’s contribution to the reforestation
programme abroad as numerator, and her total contribution as
denominator. We  expected this ratio to be affected by the informa-
tional treatments as discussed in Section “Economic background
and hypotheses”. Table 4 shows some statistics for our dependent
variable for each treatment group. Interestingly, 86% of all contrib-
utors who  faced the neutral treatment accepted to contribute a
positive amount to the international programme, with the average
contribution at 63%. This suggests that participants to the exper-
iment might not have opposed the principle of having emissions
A. Baranzini et al. / Journal of Fores
Table  4
Allocation of the monetary contributions to the programme abroad, per treatment.
T0 T1 T2 T3
Mean contribution to the
international programme (% of
total contribution)
0.63 0.73 0.64 0.59
(0.35) (0.36) (0.34) (0.33)
Frequency of contributions to the
international programme > 0
0.86 0.88 0.87 0.86
(0.35) (0.33) (0.34) (0.35)
Observations 59 66 70 66
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 5
Average treatment effects.
(1) (2)
OLS GLM
Efﬁciency treatment (T1) 0.11* 0.12*
(0.06) (0.06)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2) 0.026 0.025
(0.06) (0.06)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3) −0.025 −0.024
(0.06) (0.05)
Covariates Yes Yes
Observations 256 256
Adjusted R2 0.15
AIC 148.5 1.08
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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batements taking place abroad. For comparison, Diederich and
oeschl (2017) ﬁnd that when the cost of abating at home or abroad
s (artiﬁcially) the same, people seem to have no preference for
ither one or the other location. Hence, a large proportion of our
articipants seemed to pay some attention to the price differential,
ven though they might have not fully internalised its implications
or cost-effectiveness. A substantial part of the sample might have
owever been overlooking this differential, unless they had spe-
iﬁc preferences or concerns in favour of one project or another. As
xpected, we observed some variation across treatments. In par-
icular, contributions to the international reforestation programme
ere the highest with the efﬁciency treatment, and the lowest with
he local beneﬁts treatment.
As shown by Table 5, the estimates for the variables of interest
ere robust across OLS and GLM speciﬁcations. In what follows, we
hus again interpret the results based on the OLS estimates.8
8 The estimates for the control variables are displayed in Table A.3 in Appendix
.  All coefﬁcients had the expected sign, but most variables were not statistically
igniﬁcant. Declaring to be a frequent visitor of forests did not signiﬁcantly affect the
ontribution to the local programme, nor did having previous experience with the
omestic forest mentioned in the experiment. General ethical reservations such as
eing unwilling to consider natural resources as a marketed commodity, as well as
ther ethical concerns related to international offsets, such as opposition to carbon
arkets or concerns on the fairness of offsetting domestic emissions abroad, did not
each statistical signiﬁcance either. Given the relatively low number of observations
nd low variability of these variables, these results were not particularly surprising.
elated to the previous discussion on conditional cooperation in the climate com-
ons, we found that expectations about others’ behaviour also shaped the allocation
ecision. Finally, a variable taking value 1 for second-year students was associated
o  higher contributions to the international reforestation programme. This result
eemed consistent with Braaten et al. (2015), who maintain that students in eco-
omics are typically trained to focus on outcomes, i.e. on efﬁciency. A relatively large
trand of literature on the behaviour of economists tends to conﬁrm this result. The
ain reference is, arguably, Marwell and Ames (1981), who  ﬁnd with lab experi-
ents that graduate students in economics are more likely to respond to economic
ncentives than other subpopulations, in particular by free riding in the provision oft Economics 32 (2018) 1–12 7
Compared to the control group, the reference in the regressions,
we found that all treatments have the expected sign. The infor-
mational treatment that reminded the importance of efﬁciency
reasons (T1) and the treatment that provided guarantees on the
quality of the offset programmes (T2) had both a positive impact on
the relative allocation to the reforestation programme in Nicaragua.
Likewise, the local beneﬁts treatment (T3) increased the likelihood
of funding the domestic programme. However, only the efﬁciency
treatment had a statistically signiﬁcant impact. This result sug-
gested that participants tended to not completely factor in the
efﬁciency argument supporting the use of international carbon off-
sets. Our causal estimate suggested that the efﬁciency treatment
led to a 11 percentage point increase in the contribution to the pro-
gramme  generating carbon offsets abroad, compared to the neutral
framing of the control group.
The statistical insigniﬁcance of T2 suggested that a potential
lack of credibility of the international programme was not a major
concern for the individuals in the sample. Debrieﬁng questions
reported that only 12% of participants did not trust the Nicaraguan
government for the implementation of the international reforesta-
tion programme, while no participant stated distrust in the Swiss
government. Furthermore, we note that trust in the Nicaraguan
government for the sub-sample having experienced T2 was  not
statistically different than the reported average for the whole sam-
ple, supporting this explanation. Other reasons could contribute to
this result. It could be that the scepticism towards carbon offsets
affected domestic and international reforestation programmes in
the same way.
In the same spirit, we found that participants accounted already
to a large extent for the potential beneﬁts derived by the local
programme, including how it might have supported the local biodi-
versity, which explained the limited effectiveness of T3 in boosting
contributions to the local programme. It is worth noting that, in
recent times, Swiss forests have been growing in both standing
wood volume and surface and that their health is generally con-
sidered as good. The expectation of local co-beneﬁts might thus
have been limited in our context. In addition, in Switzerland, the
forestry sector contributes to only 0.1% of total employment and
0.06% of GDP (Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 2017).
Our results showed that the efﬁciency treatment increased the
average contribution to the international reforestation programme
relative to the domestic reforestation programme. This increased
contribution could take two  forms. In the efﬁciency treatment,
we could have either observed the same proportion of partici-
pants contributing to the international programme as in the control
group, but these would have been on average be contributing more.
On the other hand, we  could have observed a higher proportion
of participants contributing a positive sum to the international
programme, without necessarily having a different average contri-
bution. That is, the change in behaviour could have taken place both
on the intensive and extensive margins, respectively. To isolate the
effect of the extensive margin, we  looked at the treatment effects
on the proportion of individuals contributing a positive amount to
the international programme. In the same spirit, we  also looked at
heterogeneous treatment effects to determine whether responses
to this treatment varied based on some of the participants’ charac-
teristics.
Intensive vs. extensive margin
Descriptive statistics in Table 4 show that the proportion of
strictly positive contributions to the international programme did
not differ signiﬁcantly across treatments. This is conﬁrmed by the
public goods. Other notable studies on economists include Frey and Meier (2003)
and O’Roark and Wood (2011).
8 A. Baranzini et al. / Journal of Fores
Table 6
Average treatment effects on the probability to contribute to the programme abroad
(extensive margin).
(1) (2)
OLS Logit
Efﬁciency treatment (T1) 0.030 0.022
(0.058) (0.058)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2) 0.039 0.032
(0.059) (0.056)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3) 0.018 0.0048
(0.060) (0.055)
Covariates Yes Yes
Observations 256 256
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
LS and logit models presented in Table 6, showing that the effect
f the treatments on this outcome variable was not statistically
igniﬁcant.9
As presented in Table A.5 in Appendix A, the Cragg model pro-
ided very similar results to those in Tables 5 and 6. That is, it
howed that T1 was not effective on the extensive margin, but it was
n the intensive margin, and so increased average contributions to
he international programme by about 11 percentage points.
Hence, while T1 had a positive impact on the average contribu-
ion to the international programme, this treatment did not affect
he proportion of individuals contributing a positive amount to
his programme, i.e. the extensive margin. That is, participants that
ere already predisposed to contribute to the programme abroad
ere likely to increase their contribution, whereas the remaining
articipants were likely to be unaffected. Hence, in presence of
trong preferences for the local programme, the efﬁciency treat-
ent may  not be effective.
eterogeneous effects
To disentangle the heterogeneous effects of our most effective
reatment (T1) on different subgroups of the sample, we tested sev-
ral extensions of Eq. (1), adding interaction terms. We  expected
ome sub-samples to be particularly affected by the efﬁciency treat-
ent. We  tested the interaction between the efﬁciency treatment
nd the following dummy  variables: offsetting abroad is acceptable;
thical reservations with respect to the commodiﬁcation of nature; and
conomic growth, rather than environmental protection, is the prior-
ty. Similarly to the main model in the second stage, we estimated
he coefﬁcients with OLS. All the results were statistically the same
f estimated with GLM.
Column (1) shows the heterogeneous effect of T1 on individ-
als who think that it is morally acceptable to compensate CO2
missions abroad. Not surprisingly, as presented in Table 7, only
hose considering carbon offsets generated abroad as acceptable
eacted to the informational treatment, whereas those express-
ng ethical concerns were more likely to remain on their positions.
his supported the evidence provided on the treatment effect on
he extensive margin. Relatedly, column (2) shows that only the
articipants that did not have ethical reservations related to the
ommodiﬁcation of nature were affected by the efﬁciency treat-
ent. Finally, we looked at whether “green” individuals were more
r less responsive to the efﬁciency treatment than the rest of the
ample. We  used as proxy for greenness the WVS  question “Eco-
omic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if
9 Results including covariates are presented in Table A.4 in Appendix A. Estimates
rom a probit model would lead to the same conclusion.t Economics 32 (2018) 1–12
the environment suffers to some extent”. Interestingly, we found
that, on average, “green” participants tended to react more than the
average individual to the efﬁciency treatment. This suggested that,
absent any external intervention, people caring for the environ-
ment might have been reticent to contribute in “large” proportions
to the international programme, but stressing the higher environ-
mental impacts achieved abroad with the same amount of money
might have been effective in spurring participation to the interna-
tional reforestation programme.
Discussion
We  found that informational treatments emphasising the cost-
effectiveness of international offset programs could increase the
demand for the latter. Our lab experiment suggested that there
were information asymmetries, between our participants and
economists, on the beneﬁts of international abatements. In our con-
text, an informational treatment was  sufﬁcient to address part of
these asymmetries. We consider that our ﬁndings can have impor-
tant implications for policy makers, with a caveat, related to their
external validity. In what follows, we ﬁrst discuss the policy impli-
cations, and then address the caveat.
Following the recent scandals related to Joint Implementation
projects, most attention has been given to re-establishing the cred-
ibility of international offset programmes. Efforts in this direction
are welcome, but our results seem to imply that credibility may not
be the main concern for the general public. While for economists
it is obvious that efﬁciency reasons would play in favour of abating
emissions where it is cheapest, assuming that this is obvious also for
lay people may  be misleading. Information should thus be provided
to make people understand why  it is so important to undertake
emissions abatements in developing countries. Other valid argu-
ments oppose the use of international carbon abatements, but our
results suggest that stressing the importance of providing a higher
environmental beneﬁt could lead an important share of contri-
butions to switch from the local to the international programme.
Even though our paper differs in perspective and results, we join
Diederich and Goeschl (2017, p. 17) in their conclusion: “locational
preferences need not stand in the way of realising the gains from
comparative advantage in climate change mitigation”. Our policy
implications may  also extend to linked carbon markets, an option
that is currently receiving serious consideration in many jurisdic-
tions having implemented emissions trading schemes. Besides the
issue of reliability, linking carbon markets between developed and
emerging countries would also require sufﬁcient political support
in the former, backing the purchase of carbon allowances from low-
and middle-income countries. Therefore, reducing opposition to
abatements taking place abroad may be highly beneﬁcial for the
prospect of future climate policy.
These policy implications depend on whether our ﬁndings can
be applied to a broader context. Proving the external validity of
our results is beyond the scope of this experimental investiga-
tion, hence the caveat. While the evidence covered the background
section supports the external validity of lab experiments, one can
always argue that preferences for policy are context-speciﬁc. To
put our results into perspective, we  refer to the growing litera-
ture on public support for environmental policies, to which our
paper is closely related. This literature has provided a set of recur-
rent ﬁndings, regardless of whether the methods used consisted
in experimental approaches with students (e.g. Cherry et al., 2012,
2014; Kallbekken et al., 2011), qualitative surveys and focus groups
(e.g. Dresner et al., 2006; Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010), quantitative
surveys and choice experiments (e.g. Bristow et al., 2010; Sælen and
Kallbekken, 2011; Baranzini and Carattini, 2017), survey panels in a
quasi-experimental setting (Schuitema et al., 2010; Carattini et al.,
2016), or surveys combined with the observation of real ballots
(Thalmann, 2004; Carattini et al., 2017a). All these studies provide
A. Baranzini et al. / Journal of Forest Economics 32 (2018) 1–12 9
Table  7
Heterogeneous treatment effects.
(1) (2) (3)
Offsetting abroad is
acceptable
Ethical reservations w.r.t.
commodiﬁcation of nature
Economic growth is the priority
(vs. the environment)
T1 × Offset abroad 0.16*
(0.08)
T1 × NO offset abroad 0.096
(0.07)
T1 × Ethical reservations 0.068
(0.08)
T1 × NO ethical reservations 0.15**
(0.08)
T1  × Economy the priority 0.055
(0.13)
T1  × Economy NOT the priority 0.12*
(0.06)
Conﬁdence treatment 0.024 0.023 0.025
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Local  beneﬁts treatment −0.022 −0.023 −0.022
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 0.44*** 0.422*** 0.44***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 256 256 256
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19
Adjusted-R2 0.15 0.15 0.15
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. T1 represents the efﬁciency treatment. In all speciﬁcations we controlled for beliefs about others’ contribution and
frequent forest users, experience with the domestic site, acceptability of offsets abroad, ethical reservations against the commodiﬁcation of nature, climate concern, green
membership and economic growth as the priority (vs. the environment).
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vidence of a gap between people’s perceptions and economists’
rescriptions, which contributes to explain an important part of the
esistance to cost-effective environmental policies, such as carbon
axes.
This gap is very similar to that observed in our lab experiment.
ence, one could extrapolate to our context and support the exter-
al validity of our results. Furthermore, given that the participants
n our study have some knowledge of economics, our experimen-
al results are likely to provide lower-bound estimates. That is, if
nything, asymmetries of information are likely to be larger with
 fully representative sample. In our opinion, however, the main
ontribution of our paper relies on its novelty, rather than on its
eneralisability. We  provide original ﬁndings and put forward a set
f potential policy implications, whose relevance for other contexts
ay  be investigated in future studies. Our paper, along with the
oncurrent studies by Anderson and Bernauer (2016) and Diederich
nd Goeschl (2017), represents indeed an initial investigation into
 new research area on people’s preferences for local and interna-
ional abatements.
Several avenues for future research follow from our paper. While
e consider reforestation programmes, the same research question
pplies also to other offset programmes, for which the difference in
ost-effectiveness between programmes in developed and devel-
ping countries may  be even larger. In addition, future research
ay  include more than two countries, with varying costs and insti-
utional features. Methodologically speaking, such analyses may
ot only be possible in the lab. Choice experiments, for instance,
ould be particularly suited to analyse the demand for carbon off-
ets, including location as one of many attributes and split designs
o allow for randomised treatments. Researchers could also part-
er with companies offering carbon offsets, as in Kesternich et al.
2016), and analyse this question directly in the ﬁeld. The larger and
ore representative the sample, with choice-experiment surveys
r ﬁeld experiments, the stronger the external validity. Qualitative
tudies could also offer a complementary perspective to this emerg-ing literature, providing valuable information on how people’s
backgrounds and knowledge about efﬁciency and international car-
bon offsets may  affect their preferences. Qualitative studies could
also involve policy-makers, to understand the political economy
of climate policies that restrict the use of international carbon off-
sets. Finally, further research could also extend the analysis to the
role of local pollution. The more international carbon offsets can be
used, the lower the beneﬁts of climate policy in terms of local air
pollution and health. Especially in the presence of carbon trading
schemes, and potential hot spots (cf. Fowlie et al., 2012), each addi-
tional unit of abatement that takes place abroad can have negative
implications for the local population because of the co-generation
of local and global pollutants.
Conclusion
Turning the Paris Agreement’s Nationally Determined Contri-
butions into operational policies is the next challenge for policy
makers. However, many political obstacles hamper the realisation
of pledges in a cost-effective way. One of these is public resistance
to the use of carbon credits and carbon offsets associated with
greenhouse gas abatements in foreign countries. We  addressed
this issue in an experimental framework, in which participants
were requested to allocate funding between a domestic and an
international reforestation programme, the latter taking place in
a developing country, where reforestation is cheaper.
We applied several informational treatments and found that the
allocation decision was responsive to the provision of information
on the cost-effectiveness of the reforestation programme imple-
mented abroad. On the contrary, the decision was not particularly
responsive to guarantees addressing a potential lack of credibil-
ity of the reforestation programme in the developing country and
to information on the local beneﬁts associated with the domes-
tic programme. Our results suggest that stressing the potential for
higher abatements in foreign countries is effective in changing par-
1 f Forest Economics 32 (2018) 1–12
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Table A.3 (Continued)
(1) (2)
OLS GLM
Second-year student 0.068* 0.067*
(0.04) (0.04)
Frequent forest user 0.033 0.034
(0.06) (0.06)
Experience with domestic site −0.043 −0.043
(0.04) (0.04)
Offsetting abroad is acceptable 0.019 0.023
(0.04) (0.04)
Ethical reservations w.r.t. to the
commodiﬁcation of nature
−0.031 −0.032
(0.04) (0.04)
Carbon markets are acceptable 0.0083 −0.0069
(0.05) (0.05)
Green member 0.10 0.11
(0.06) (0.07)
Observations 256 256
Adjusted R2 0.15
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table A.4
Average treatment effects on the probability to contribute (extensive margin).
(1) (2)
Logit OLS
Efﬁciency treatment 0.022 0.030
(0.058) (0.058)
Conﬁdence treatment 0.032 0.039
(0.056) (0.059)
Local beneﬁts treatment 0.0048 0.018
(0.055) (0.060)
Belief about others’ contribution abroad 0.19*** 0.22***
(0.029) (0.054)
Second-year student 0.029 0.025
(0.039) (0.041)
Frequent forest user 0.042 0.040
(0.059) (0.048)
Experience with domestic site −0.024 −0.022
(0.040) (0.042)
Offsetting abroad is acceptable 0.068 0.056
(0.051) (0.042)
Ethical reservations w.r.t. to the
commodiﬁcation of nature
0.013 0.010
(0.039) (0.040)
Carbon markets are acceptable −0.040 −0.030
(0.049) (0.051)
Green member 0.13 0.081
(0.11) (0.051)
Covariates Yes Yes
Observations 256 256
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table A.5
Average marginal effects from Cragg model: second stage.
Contributions to the international programme > 0 (0/1)
Efﬁciency treatment (T1) 0.021
(0.056)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2) 0.0290 A. Baranzini et al. / Journal o
icipants’ priors in favour of international carbon offsets. Hence,
ndividuals may  be willing to increase their support for the use of
nternational carbon offsets and related carbon markets, provided
hat they are in position to appreciate their environmental beneﬁts.
Our novel ﬁndings contribute to the literature on the acceptabil-
ty of climate policy instruments and on the emerging literature on
arbon offsets. They suggest that some of the potential resistance
o the use of carbon credits and carbon offsets generated in foreign
ountries may  be, to some extent, spurious. Effective communica-
ion from policy makers could then address, and partly overcome,
s in our experiment, such resistance. As policy-makers take their
ime to implement the required policies, the level of stringency
equested to meet the climate targets increases. International car-
on offsets could represent an important solution to ensure that
he current pledges are met, thus supporting the Paris Agreement’s
atchet mechanism, and the durability of the whole agreement.
ppendix A.
able A.1
escriptive statistics (1st stage).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Endowment CHF 7.2 1.87 2 10 299
Contribution > 0 0/1 0.86 0.35 0 1 299
Contribution (% of initial endowment) 0.70 0.4 0 1 299
Climate concern 0/1 0.86 0.34 0 1 299
Small contributions are important 0/1 0.85 0.36 0 1 299
Green member 0/1 0.09 0.29 0 1 299
Moral obligation 0/1 0.67 0.47 0 1 299
Belief about others’ contribution (% of
initial endowment)
0.53 0.30 0 1 299
Frequent forest user 0/1 0.19 0.39 0 1 299
Practical reservations w.r.t.
reforestation 0/1
0.27 0.45 0 1 299
Ethical reservations w.r.t. the
commodiﬁcation of nature 0/1
0.48 0.5 0 1 299
able A.2
escriptive statistics (2nd stage).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Belief about others’ contribution
abroad 0/1
0.70 0.46 0 1 256
Second-year student 0/1 0.43 0.520 0 1 256
Frequent forest user 0/1 0.19 0.39 0 1 256
Experience with domestic site 0/1 0.35 0.48 0 1 256
Offsetting abroad is acceptable 0/1 0.29 0.45 0 1 256
Ethical reservations w.r.t. the
commodiﬁcation of nature 0/1
0.49 0.50 0 1 256
Carbon markets are acceptable 0/1 0.21 0.41 0 1 256
Green member 0/1 0.10 0.30 0 1 256
Economy the priority 0/1 0.11 0.31 0 1 256
able A.3
verage treatment effects
(1) (2)
OLS GLM
Efﬁciency treatment (T1) 0.11* 0.12*
(0.06) (0.06)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2) 0.026 0.025
(0.06) (0.06)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3) −0.025 −0.024(0.06) (0.05)
Belief about others’ contribution abroad 0.26*** 0.24***
(0.05) (0.04)
(0.054)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3) 0.0038
(0.054)
A. Baranzini et al. / Journal of Fores
Table  A.5 (Continued)
Belief about others’ contribution abroad 0.18***
(0.037)
Second-year student 0.033
(0.039)
Frequent forest user 0.030
(0.054)
Experience with domestic site −0.026
(0.039)
Offsetting abroad is acceptable 0.052
(0.046)
Ethical reservations w.r.t commodiﬁcation of nature 0.013
(0.038)
Carbon markets are acceptable −0.021
(0.048)
Green member 0.092
(0.088)
Contribution to the international programme (% of total contribution)
Efﬁciency treatment (T1) 0.11**
(0.046)
Conﬁdence treatment (T2) −0.0050
(0.047)
Local beneﬁts treatment (T3) −0.044
(0.047)
Belief about others’ contribution abroad 0.13***
(0.040)
Second-year student 0.059*
(0.032)
Frequent forest user 0.0070
(0.047)
Experience with domestic site −0.027
(0.037)
Offsetting abroad is acceptable −0.018
(0.034)
Ethical reservations w.r.t commodiﬁcation of nature −0.046
(0.033)
Carbon markets are acceptable 0.024
(0.041)
Green member 0.052
(0.051)
Observations 256
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
A
t
R
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A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
ppendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
he online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfe.2018.02.004.
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